
### **Secure Face Matching Using Fully Homomorphic Encryption**

Vishnu Boddeti Michigan State University

October 23rd, 2018

## >>> Face Representation and Matching


\* Face Representation:



[2/1]

## >>> Face Representation and Matching

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
\* Face Matching:



[2/1]

## >>> Security Vulnerabilities

\* Attacks on Biometric Systems:




[3/1]

Mai, Guangcan, Kai Cao, C. YUEN Pong, and Anil K. Jain. "On the Reconstruction of Face Images from Deep Face Templates." PAMI 2018

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- \* Attacks on Templates:
  - \* Face reconstruction from template<sup>1</sup>




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
[3/1]

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


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  - \* Face reconstruction from template<sup>1</sup>
  - \* Privacy leakage through attribute prediction from template





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[7]\$ -



(a) Fuzzy Vault





(a) Fuzzy Vault

(b) Geometrical Transformations

[~]\$ \_

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
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test image

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MACE files

(c) Correlation with Random Masks

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Exergence

training images MACE filter

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
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
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
[4/1]








(b) Geometrical Transformations



(c) Correlation with Random Masks

(d) Biohashing

[~]\$ \_



Drawback: Trade-Off matching performance for template security.

[\*]5 -

\* Data encryption is an attractive option.

[5/1]

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
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- \* Encryption scheme needs to allow computations directly on the encrypted data.

[7]\$ \_



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This Paper Explores:


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### This Paper Explores:

- \* feasibility of fully homomorphic encryption for secure face matching.
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
[^]\$ \_

- Client device:
  - \* generates cryptographic keys




[7]5 -

- Client device:
  - \* generates cryptographic keys
  - \* captures biometric signature + extracts feature




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  - \* transmits encrypted feature + identity label to remote database




[7/1]


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


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
[8/1]

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
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[8/1]

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  - \* homomorphic inner product between encrypted probe and gallery
  - \* transmits encrypted scores to client
- \* Client device:
  - \* decrypts received scores and makes decision



[9,1]

## >>> Homomorphic Inner Products

\* Feature Matching:

Euclidean Distance: 
$$d(x,y) = \|x-y\|_2^2 = x^Tx + y^Ty - 2x^Ty$$
  
Cosine Similarity:  $s(x,y) = \frac{x^Ty}{\|x\|\|y\|}$ 

[^]\$ \_ [9/1]

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
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\* Homomorphic Inner Product:

$$s(oldsymbol{x},oldsymbol{y}) = \mathcal{D}\left(\sum_{i=1}^d \mathcal{E}(x_i,oldsymbol{ heta}_e)\mathcal{E}(y_i,oldsymbol{ heta}_e),oldsymbol{ heta}_d
ight)$$

[<sup>^</sup>]\$ <sub>-</sub> [9/1]



Timer Froduct. a nomomorphic multiplications + a - 1 nomomorphic additions


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  - \* Encode entire vector at once + repetitive circular shift and addition



#### >>> Experimental Setup

Datasets: LFW, IJB-A, IJB-B and CASIA

\* Models: FaceNet (128-D) and SphereFace (512-D)

\* Evaluation: True Accept Rate 0.01%, 0.1% and 1% FAR

\* Options: different quantization, security levels, dimensionality of features

[11/1]

- \* Pairwise Matching Time
  - \* Homomorphic Encryption
  - \* Homomorphic Matching
  - \* Homomorphic Decryption
- \* Template Size
  - \* Database storage size
  - \* Communicating encrypted templates

[12/1]

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#### Table: Matching Time and Template Memory

| Security    | Dim   | No F      | HE   |     | No Batching |      |       |      | Batching |       |      |       |      |
|-------------|-------|-----------|------|-----|-------------|------|-------|------|----------|-------|------|-------|------|
| in bits     | ווווט | Time      | Mem  |     | Time        | (ms) |       | Mem  |          | Time  | (ms) |       | Mem  |
| $(\lambda)$ | (d)   | $(\mu s)$ | (KB) | Enc | Score       | Dec  | Total | (MB) | Enc      | Score | Dec  | Total | (KB) |
|             | 64    | 0.44      | 2.0  |     |             |      |       |      |          |       |      |       |      |
|             | 128   | 0.89      | 4.0  |     |             |      |       |      |          |       |      |       |      |
|             | 512   | 3.48      | 16.0 |     |             |      |       |      |          |       |      |       |      |
|             | 1024  | 7.49      | 32.0 |     |             |      |       |      |          |       |      |       |      |

[12/1]

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|             | 64    | 0.44      | 2.0  | 4.40    | 5.25        | 0.01 | 9.66    | 0.25  |          |       |      |       |      |  |
|             | 128   | 0.89      | 4.0  | 17.57   | 21.05       | 0.02 | 38.64   | 1.0   |          |       |      |       |      |  |
| 128         | 512   | 3.48      | 16.0 | 280.19  | 343.81      | 0.08 | 624.07  | 16.5  |          |       |      |       |      |  |
|             | 1024  | 7.49      | 32.0 | 2214.88 | 2924.75     | 0.33 | 5139.97 | 131.0 |          |       |      |       |      |  |

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|             | 128   | 0.89 | 4.0  | 17.57   | 21.05       | 0.02 | 38.64   | 1.0   | 0.14     | 0.38  | 0.02 | 0.59  | 4.0  |  |
| 128         | 512   | 3.48 | 16.0 | 280.19  | 343.81      | 0.08 | 624.07  | 16.5  | 0.58     | 1.80  | 0.07 | 2.45  | 16.0 |  |
|             | 1024  | 7.49 | 32.0 | 2214.88 | 2924.75     | 0.33 | 5139.97 | 131.0 | 2.27     | 8.36  | 0.30 | 11.42 | 32.0 |  |

[12/1]

#### >>> Homomorphic Matching Performance

\* Face verification: different quantization levels

Table: Face Recognition Accuracy (TAR @ FAR in %)

| Dataset | Method                     | 128   | -D Facel | Net   |   | 512-D SphereFace |       |       |  |  |
|---------|----------------------------|-------|----------|-------|---|------------------|-------|-------|--|--|
| Dataset | Method                     | 0.01% | 0.1%     | 1%    | _ | 0.01%            | 0.1%  | 1%    |  |  |
|         | No FHE                     | 25.77 | 48.31    | 74.47 |   | 7.86             | 31.27 | 69.83 |  |  |
| IJB-B   | FHE $(2.5 \times 10^{-3})$ | 25.78 | 48.28    | 74.46 |   | 7.86             | 31.27 | 69.82 |  |  |
|         | FHE $(1.0 \times 10^{-2})$ | 25.71 | 48.31    | 74.44 |   | 7.80             | 31.29 | 69.75 |  |  |
|         | FHE $(1.0 \times 10^{-1})$ | 23.75 | 46.08    | 72.87 |   | 7.49             | 30.92 | 67.45 |  |  |

[13/1]

\* Facial template security is of growing importance.

| >>> | Take | Home | Messag |
|-----|------|------|--------|
|     |      |      |        |

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[14/1]

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  - \* Limitation: encryption and decryption key are on client device
  - \* Consequence: key management on client device is the weakest link

[14/1]